There is a perennial tendency amongst participants and followers of the British political scene to find comparisons with US politics; few should be surprised that last Thursday’s much anticipated set of UK local elections were widely likened to the US mid-terms. This reflected their timing (two years into a parliamentary term that cannot exceed five) but also their scope. The remorseless turn of the electoral wheel meant that this was the year of all-out contests for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh senate and London boroughs with a smattering of English county and district elections; a widely scattered set of electoral tests permitting a genuine taking of the political temperature throughout the UK with the added bonus of convenience for the Westminster village of some fiercely fought contests in and around central London.
The volatility and then fragmentation that has characterised British party politics in recent years was richly reinforced by the outcome of these elections. For Labour and Conservative alike, the results were dire – normally the unerring pendulum of political fortune has favoured one of the duopolies when the other struggles. This time round the two traditional big parties of UK politics won in aggregate fewer than two in five of the seats up for grabs; as the ‘main’ opposition party and self-styled government in waiting, the Conservatives came fourth in its overall tally of council seats.
The performance in Scotland of the SNP is a salutary lesson that the politics of our time are supremely volatile and unpredictable. A party so recently engulfed by personnel and financial scandal; losing four-fifths of its seats in the 2024 UK General Election and harbouring a sub-optimal track record in its two-decades long dominance at Holyrood, the SNP might have contemplated with some trepidation this year’s Scottish Parliamentary elections. Yet the implosion of Labour’s support north of the border, which had appeared to have recovered strongly in recent years, eased the SNP’s path to a further term in office. In this part of the UK the highly competitive and polarised six party politics worked to the SNP’s benefit.
Deeply disappointing as their Scotch reverses may have been, Labour’s performance in Wales was nothing short of cataclysmic. For over a century Welsh politics has been controlled by the Labour Party; as a movement some of its earliest victories in the first decade of the 1900s came in the south Wales mining communities; in its darkest electoral days of 1931, 1983 and 2019, Labour dominated in the Principality; even the rigours of a proportional representation structure (rather than first past the post voting) had not prevented Labour unremittingly holding office since the Welsh senate came into being in 1999. Until last week. Humiliatingly it was plunged into a distant third place in the national vote, squeezed to its left by the Welsh nationalists (Plaid Cymru) and amongst its traditional core-vote by Reform UK. The Tories plunged from 36% of the vote and over a third of the parliamentary seats in Wales less than seven years ago to under 11% and a handful of lowly-placed regional list members under the senate’s PR system.
London offered a fascinating and wildly unpredictable hotchpotch of results amidst its 32 boroughs. For all of the political parties there were sufficient snippets of good news in some local councils to enable their public relations teams to spin a plausibly positive story. The small consolation for Labour was that it remained, by a sizeable margin, the largest party by seats won and councils run in the Capital. In fairness Labour’s baseline from the previous elections in 2022 was a near all-time high of 1156 seats; nevertheless, it sustained heavy losses to the Green Party in some of its traditional strongholds such as Hackney, Lewisham, Waltham Forest and Lambeth. Labour lost more than a third of their councillors in London; over the last half century only in 2006 have they performed worse.
The Conservatives relatively competitive performance in London came about largely as a consequence of its core vote being less vulnerable to being swallowed up by Reform UK than Labour’s being cannibalised by the Greens. To great fanfare it won back Westminster Council, which had been lost unprecedently at the previous election. Nevertheless, there were tantalising near-misses in two other once safe flagship Tory targets, Wandsworth and Barnet, as well as in Enfield. Yet when all was said and done in terms of council seats won, the Tories’ London performance was almost identical to that of 2022 when the equivalent contests last took place. That then represented by some distance its worst ever result in the Capital. This also placed into sharper relief the party’s performance elsewhere – losing well over half the seats it was defending from that historically low baseline four years ago.
The Liberal Democrats continue to make steady progress albeit – whisper it quietly – largely by fishing from the same pool as other disruptors to the historic two-party system. They strongly reinforced their position at local level in those parts of the south east (Surrey, Sussex, Hampshire, Cambridgeshire) where they so spectacularly captured parliamentary seats from the Conservatives two years ago, which suggests that many of those former Tory strongholds will not be returning any time soon. However, their advances in London at Labour’s expense were blunted by the presence of the Green Party, whose remarkable rise catapulted it into third place in London politics. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats made more modest headway that they would have wished in the Midlands and northern England where, in contrast to Labour’s most recent collapse in popularity in office two decades ago, it was Reform UK who benefited from that shift in sentiment.
The Green Party’s appeal rocketed amongst progressive younger voters especially in London and university towns. Its charismatic new leader, Zack Polanski, has ruthless exploited the gap in the market for a radical, populist left-wing party left by the demise of Corbynism in the Labour Party. In the months ahead the pressure on the government, not least from its activist base, will be to emulate Polanski’s leftist policy prescriptions (rent control, wealth taxes etc) although it is questionable whether it will be any more successful in attracting back lost voters than it has been by leaning towards Reform UK on immigration over the past year or so.
So, to the undisputed, runaway victors in this strange set of electoral contests – Reform UK. A common and lazy error made by much of the political media is to assume that the party’s entire appeal hinges on immigration. Substantial activity continues behind the scenes on a radical blueprint for economic transformation and much else besides. This has some parallels with the intellectual underpinning of Thatcherism and has the potential to generate similar levels of excitement as well as wresting from the Conservatives their reputation, which runs deep in UK political culture, as the team you may not like but can trust with your money. Expect to hear more about tackling cost of living concerns, especially over food price inflation. But at the heart of Reform UK’s appeal lie cultural factors; whilst Nigel Farage has not yet used the phrase, he is essentially pitching to the ‘silent majority’ who have been dismayed – and feel unable to counter – the cultural upheaval of recent decades, especially in the realm of identity politics and the barely disguised left and liberal disdain for the national pride felt by many blue-collar and unskilled workers. Its challenge now is to articulate a twenty-first century social force that Reform UK will unremittingly be seen to represent.
What are the implications of these results? Let me begin with a couple of general observations before turning to my take on some of the immediate and specific consequences that are likely to be well aired in the media in the days and weeks ahead.
We need to acknowledge that the much-maligned short-termism in policy and decision-making will partly mirror the political longevity (or otherwise) of frontline politicians. The sheer volatility of voting and the fragmentation of the party system means that the concept of a ‘safe seat’ has virtually expired. When first elected in 2001, I inherited a constituency which over the previous 120 years had always returned an MP from my political party; as a result I was able to plan for a political career that would probably last for decades (as it happened I left parliament after five terms and almost nineteen years) which helped me to think of policy issues over a longer time frame. Nowadays few politicians, national or local, seem set to enjoy this luxury. Although it is only six years (and two General Elections) since I sat in parliament, 422 of the 650 current MPs have arrived since my departure. Moreover, for many in parliament, even those on the Ministerial benches, their capacity to earn more outside parliament than within it is strictly limited. This is a useful counterblast to the speculation that we might be on for a General Election any sooner than mid-2029; I suspect most current MPs will support clinging on until the last moment to utilise to the full the earning capacity of life in frontline politics and will be predominantly invested in supporting only partisan, short-term policy initiatives.
Secondly with the system of party politics now so disjointed and fractured the electoral system that has broadly served the UK well over many decades is arguably no longer fit for purpose. For a nation that has a near obsession with remembrance, there has been relatively little coverage of the fact that this week is the one-hundredth anniversary of the General Strike (which took place between 3-12 May 1926). This seminal episode helped embed the UK’s Conservative/Labour party duopoly, which now seems so close to collapse. Naturally for those who are able to win office under first past the post, there is little incentive once elected to change the rules of engagement even when victory is achieved with the support of ever smaller minorities of the electorate. This also adds to the sense that no party can nowadays win re-election whilst being honest with voters about the sacrifices and trade-offs that lie ahead. The spiral of distrust and disillusionment that rapidly comes to pass presents a mortal threat to democracy at a time when so many Britons regard themselves – and their views – as not being properly represented.
It is often said that modern day politics has become less a serious endeavour and more like a daily soap-opera, so almost inevitably at times like this attention turns to the prospects of its leading characters.
I must confess that I was instinctively sceptical last autumn when the first feverish speculation arose that Sir Keir Starmer’s leadership might be under threat. Regicide might be in the DNA of the Conservative Party, but the Labour tradition has been to tolerate even palpably failing leaders until they depart of their own volition.
I also found it almost impossibly difficult to translate my direct experience of the Prime Minister from four decades ago as a quietly spoken, determined, but inoffensive fellow law student at the same Oxford college into the vitriolic dislike and hatred bordering on the irrational that he now attracts even from many level-headed voters. No-one has ever accused Starmer of being over-endowed in the charisma stakes, but on the international stage he invariably comes across as a diligent man of substance. As a convincing diplomat for the UK abroad he is by a fair margin the most impressive PM since David Cameron. Yet Starmer’s personal authority has been eviscerated by countless policy U-turns and his hapless handling of the Mandelson ambassadorial appointment scandal. As I type these words speculation abounds in the daunting days that lie ahead about the precise method of formal challenge to his position, but it is difficult to imagine that he will still be in office by the end of the year. I suspect I shall need to return to this subject before the world is much older in a future written briefing.
Meanwhile in the Blue Corner of British politics, the existential threat to the Conservatives as a prospective party of government has barely abated. Whilst Kemi Badenoch’s performance has improved immeasurably over recent months, her improved poll ratings have not been replicated by those of the party she leads. Her repeated claims that it is ‘under new leadership’ ring hollow when all the Conservative frontline figures are associated with the abject failures of recent years. New faces will need to be brought forward especially as the Tories, no less than Labour, are vulnerable to losing support from both their right and left flank. Much has been made of the leakage of their activists and voters to Reform UK, but the strategy of relentlessly seeking to placate this demographic has, as we have seen, enabled the Liberal Democrats to capitalise further in many of the 64 constituencies (Reform UK won only five then) they captured from the Tories at the last General Election. It is probably too soon to read the last rites for the Conservative Party, but some political historians reflect that the parliamentary party may in time suffer the fate of the Liberals during the turbulent period between 1916 and 1931; fatally split over policy and personalities with large elements being absorbed by Reform UK and smaller scraps heading to the Liberal Democrats or out of politics altogether.
The emergence of multi-party politics will be difficult to sustain under first past the post elections. The point-blank refusal of the SNP to engage with Reform UK in its power sharing discussions for the Scottish Parliament is an early sign that politicians may seek to deal with fragmentation by formalising power blocks, loosely representing the political left and right. Our current electoral system cannot for long sustain five or six party politics, not least as the credibility of candidates elected on twenty-or-so percent of the vote, will make governing increasingly difficult.
After these results talk of an electoral pact between Conservatives and Reform UK will only intensify in the months ahead. On the one hand – and with some justification – Nigel Farage will claim that his party does not need (or want) an association with the tarnished brand that is today’s Conservative Party. On the other, all this speculation underestimates the sophistication of many electors who can work out the state of play – especially so when all too often they are motivated by an overriding desire to keep out a specific contender in their own locality.
From the Conservative perspective talk of pacts is designed to keep up morale as poll ratings continue to flatline but also to assuage those elements of the party membership which largely regard Reform UK as a sister party. Whilst Farage has been quoted as floating the idea with party donors, he probably holds the pragmatic view that it may be difficult for Reform UK to achieve an overall majority even from its current base. Yet allowing the prospect of a pact with the Conservatives to gain momentum might also prove very effective for Farage. First it cements in the electorate’s eyes the idea that the Conservatives are the junior partner, desperately needing Reform’s help to survive. It also establishes in many minds that it is inevitable that the Conservatives will only now ever be closely aligned with Reform UK, so further eroding centrist support for the Conservatives; perhaps this has been highlighted by the virtually invisible impact since its launch in January of the thinktank-cum-pressure group, Prosper UK, by many prominent Cameron-era party figures.
Talk of formal or informal arrangements also encourages a mindset amongst would-be Tory supporters that if they are going to vote for a party that is just going to prop up Reform UK, why not simply sign up for the real thing? Finally, it may also encourage further defections from within the parliamentary ranks – Conservative MPs will remember that in the 2010-2015 coalition it was the smaller party who were electorally wiped-out at the subsequent election. If that is to be the fate of any makeweight in an electoral pact, then perhaps it would be better simply to be done with it and formally link up with larger party.
Party leaders can keep denying that a pact is in the offing. Party members and voters will believe whatever they want to believe. It also weakens any Tory leader and erodes trust every time they deny it, especially if in the end they need to capitulate.
The risk on the other side is that talk of electoral deals in advance of an election will discourage Reform UK’s supporters. If they had wanted to support the Conservatives, they would have done so. But they will likely believe Farage when he denies it. In truth Nigel Farage just needs Conservative voters to hear chatter about an electoral accommodation for Conservative support to erode further. If this all picks up momentum, it will become self-reinforcing, and Reform UK may not need a pact by the time the next general election rolls around. But as we all know there is much water to flow under the UK’s volatile political bridge before then.
Written on 11 May 2026 by The Rt Hon Mark Field, former Member of Parliament (MP) for Cities of London and Westminster and Consultant at Buchler Phillips, an independent boutique firm with an impeccable Mayfair London heritage, specialising in corporate recovery, turnaround, restructuring and insolvency.